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Stocktakng	the	Reforms	n	Publc	
Fnancal	Management1
Michael L.O. Stevens and Lev M. Freinkman
11.1 Introduction
In the years preceding Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, public financial 
management	at	 all	 ters	of	government	had	 reached	 ts	nadr.	After	over	a	decade	
of	mltary	msrule,	governance	had	 touched	bottom	wth	 the	 substtuton	of	arb-
trary	decsons	for	proper	process,	and	the	massve	lootng	of	state	assets	by	General	
Abacha. Since then, with nowhere to go but upwards, standards of public financial 
management	have	been	mprovng	but,	as	ths	chapter	explans,	progress	has	been	
uneven,	wth	encouragng	performance	n	some	areas	and	slower	change	n	others.	
Ths	chapter	summarzes	the	man	developments,	and	then	goes	on	to	assess	the	cur-
rent state of public financial management in Nigeria against rapidly establishing glo-
bal	standards.	In	ths	way	t	benchmarks	current	performance	so	that	future	progress	
can	be	measured,	and	suggests	the	crtcal	areas	for	early	attenton	by	polcy	leaders	
n	the	years	ahead.
At first the emphasis of the new administration was on restoring rule-bound fi-
nancial management, and one of the first steps of the government was to reissue 
Financial Instructions,	the	long-neglected	set	of	regulatons	governng	the	conduct	
of government financial transactions. The new government also set about tackling the 
overhang	of	nherted	problems,	such	as	external	debt	and	nternal	payment	arrears,	
and	started	 the	process	of	catchng	up	 n	complaton	and	audtng	of	government	
accounts and financial statements. However, aggregate spending at all levels of gov-
ernment	remaned	revenue	drven,	as	ol	prces	began	recoverng	from	ther	global	
lows	at	the	end	of	mltary	rule,	and	reached	about	45	per	cent	of	GDP	by	2001,	an	
uncharacteristically high figure for a developing country, masking huge inefficien-
cies in spending. Overall, rapid fiscal expansion in 1999–2001 had looked as if old 
habts	of	wasteful	spendng	were	returnng.	At	 the	federal	 level	 there	were	efforts	
made	 to	 mprove	 the	qualty	of	 spendng,	partcularly	wth	 the	Captal	Budget,	 n	
whch	there	was	an	early	realzaton	that	the	bulk	of	spendng	was	gong	on	long-
runnng	projects	of	doubtful	value	and	lttle	prospect	of	early	completon.	But	n	the	
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man,	whle	some	mprovements	were	launched	by	the	federal	government	and	some	
of	the	more	progressve-mnded	states,	much	of	the	fundamental	weakness	n	publc	
financial management remained unaddressed. It seemed that for the first four years 
after 1999 the challenge of government financial management reform had not really 
been	grasped.
The	pace	of	reform,	however,	pcked	up	at	the	federal	level	after	the	2003	pres-
dental	electons,	and	the	appontment	of	a	new	economc	team	wth	what	seemed	
a strong reform mandate from the president. Since then, significant steps have been 
taken to increase the transparency of the budget process, ensure more efficient cash 
management,	and	reform	procurement	processes.	A	major	effort	was	made	to	mod-
ernize the legal framework for public financial management, through the drafting of 
new laws, updating the colonial era basic finance law, introducing a new audit law 
that	promses	greater	ndependence	to	the	supreme	audt	nsttuton,	makng	statutory	
prncples	of	open,	compettve	tenderng	and	creatng	an	autonomous	procurement	
regulator. The government also drafted the fiscal responsibility legislation aimed at 
smoothng	ol	revenues	and	endng	the	boom/borrowng/bust	syndrome	of	prevous	
ol	 prce	 cycles.	 In	 addton,	Ngera	 became	 an	 actve	member	 of	 the	Extractve	
Industres	Transparency	Intatve	(EITI),	commttng	the	country	to	hgher	standards	
of	transparency	n	the	management	of	mneral	revenues.	
The	most	postve	development	snce	2003	has	been	the	pursut	of	a	more	dsc-
plined fiscal policy by the federal government. Budgets since 2004 have been made 
on	the	bass	of	an	assumed	long	run	prce	of	ol,	wth	excess	revenues	sterlzed	n	the	
Bank	of	Ngera.	Whle	real	spendng	has	been	mantaned,	the	share	of	consoldated	
budget	 spendng	 n	GDP	has	 fallen	 to	a	more	sustanable	 (and	absorbable)	35	per	
cent. The counterpart of fiscal prudence has been the build-up of substantial foreign 
exchange	reserves	n	the	Central	Bank.	Partly	n	recognton	of	these	achevements,	
n	2005	Ngera	won	substantal	external	debt	reducton	through	the	Pars	Club.
At the same time many features of weakness in public financial management 
have continued. At the federal level, significant contractual and pension arrears (es-
tmated	at	$3	bllon	at	the	end	of	2005)	reman	to	be	tackled,	though	consderable	
progress	was	made	n	2006	n	repayng	debts	to	small	contractors	and	pensoners.	A	
unversal	prncple	of	publc	budgetng	s	that	planned	spendng	should	be	wthn	the	
budget	and	voted	upon.	Currently,	however,	about	40	per	cent	of	non-nterest	spend-
ng	admnstered	by	the	federal	government	les	outsde	the	annual	budget	process	
and	thus	democratc	control.	Ths	ncludes	the	nvestment	costs	(‘cash	calls’)	of	the	
Ngeran	Natonal	Petroleum	Company	(NNPC)	and,	most	recently,	major	power	and	
road investments jointly funded by all tiers of government. Spending financed by 
external	borrowng	and	ad	also	les	mostly	outsde	budgets.	In	the	past	three	years	
extra-budgetary	expendture	has	averaged	42	per	cent	of	non-nterest	spendng	voted	
through	the	federal	budget.
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Although	parastatal	subsdes	are	now	less	that	they	once	were,	they	reman	sg-
nificant, with budget subsidization of the power, railways and ports sectors amount-
ng	to	0.9	per	cent	of	GDP	n	2004.	Furthermore,	the	new	fully	funded	publc	penson	
scheme introduced in 2004 has major funding gaps, arising from the need to finance 
old	and	new	penson	systems	smultaneously	f	the	full	costs	of	transton	are	to	be	
borne.	
However,	 the	most	 persstent	 problem	 has	 been	 the	 qualty	 of	 spendng,	wth	
continuing inefficiency and leakages in both the current and capital budgets. In the 
former there is inadequate funding of maintenance and operational costs and inflated 
payroll costs, due to a combination of payroll fraud and overstaffing. Projects con-
tnue	to	be	poorly	planned	and	executed,	wth	long	delays	n	mplementng	projects.	
It	s	as	f	Ngera	at	both	federal	and	state	levels	s	nvestng	ever-ncreasng	amounts	
n	 non-yeldng	 assets,	 n	 the	 form	of	 a	 lengthenng	ppelne	 of	 never-completng	
projects.	As	a	result,	despte	hgh	levels	of	spendng	n	these	sectors,	health	outcomes	
reman	extremely	low	and	have	not	mproved	over	the	years,	and	adult	lteracy	rates	
and	the	enrolment	of	grls	n	prmary	educaton	reman	unacceptably	low	for	a	coun-
try	of	Ngera’s	standng	and	ambton.	Massve	spendng	on	power	generaton	has	
not	allevated	power	shortages,	and	n	the	roads	sector	hgh	transport	costs	and	poor	
safety	condtons	contnue	to	mpose	an	unacceptable	burden	on	the	economy	and	
socety	generally.	
All of this points to the verdict that the problem in Nigeria is low efficiency of 
budget	spendng	rather	than	nadequate	amounts	of	fundng	at	all	levels	of	govern-
ment. In turn the causes of low efficiency of public spending reach deep into the way 
n	whch	budgets	are	made	and	mplemented,	the	formal	and	nformal	ncentves	of	
budget	actors,	and	the	way	government	at	all	levels	s	managed,	both	bureaucratcally	
and politically. With continuing high oil prices, there is undoubtedly fiscal space 
to expand government spending, but there is a risk that, given weak public finance 
management	(PFM)	capacty,	scalng	up	to	acheve	the	country’s	development	goals	
better	may	result	once	agan	n	heavy	msmanagement	of	ol	surpluses.	And,	as	past	
experience has shown, there are benefits from not spending surplus revenues imme-
dately,	but	spreadng	ther	use	over	the	ol	prce	cycle.	
The rest of this chapter is about how Nigeria’s public financial system stacks up 
aganst	nternatonal	standards,	the	better	to	see	current	nsttutons	and	ther	capac-
tes	n	a	wder	perspectve.	The	purpose	s	not	to	demonstrate	that	Ngera	falls	short	
of	nternatonal	best	practce,	but	rather	to	show	where	progress	has	been	made	and	
where	much	stll	remans	to	be	done,	both	n	the	mprovement	of	formal	rules	and	
processes,	but	also	n	 the	capacty	to	follow	them.	The	latter	 s	at	 the	heart	of	 the	
challenge.	For,	whle	the	desgn	of	Ngera’s	PFM	system	clearly	needs	modernzng,	
even	to	operate	t	as	once	ntended	would	be	an	mmedate	mprovement.	
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11.2 GlobalstandardsandthePEFAframework
In	the	past	two	decades	there	has	been	a	growng	nterest	n	developng	nternatonal	
standards across the full spectrum of public financial management. This has been 
led	by	nsttutons	lke	the	Internatonal	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	the	Organzaton	for	
Economc	Cooperaton	 and	Development	 (OECD),	 the	 Internatonal	Organzaton	
of	Supreme	Audt	Insttutons	(INTOSAI),	the	Internatonal	Federaton	of	Account-
ants	(IFAC)	and	the	UN.	The	IMF	has	developed	a	Code	of	Fscal	Transparency;	the	
OECD	has	ntroduced	a	12-ndcator	assessment	framework	for	publc	procurement;	
INTOSAI	 has	 developed	 standards	 for	 government	 external	 audtng,	 and	 IFAC	
for	 government	 accountng;	 and	 the	UN	has	 for	 over	 a	 decade	had	 a	model	 pub-
lc	procurement	law.	Most	recently,	the	EU,	IMF	and	World	Bank	have	cooperated	
to	develop	an	ntegrated	framework	of	28	hgh-level	performance	ndcators,	each	
wth	performance	graduatons,	to	benchmark	countres.	By	the	end	of	2006	about	33	
countres	had	undergone	assessments	based	upon	the	Publc	Expendture	and	Fnan-
cal	Accountablty	(PEFA)	framework,	one	of	whch	has	been	Ngera.	
The	drvers	of	ths	search	for	common	standards	have	been	several.	One	undoubt-
edly	has	been	globalzaton	and	the	ncrease	n	foregn	drect	nvestment.	Another	has	
been	debt	relef	that	has	been	condtoned	not	only	on	macroeconomc	management,	
but	also	the	ablty	of	debtor	countres	to	ensure	debt	relef	s	used	effectvely.	A	fur-
ther factor has been the growing realization that the fight against corruption depends 
fundamentally on how public finances are controlled, managed, reported transpar-
ently	and	accounted	for.	Last,	but	by	no	means	least,	there	s	the	advantage	that,	f	
a	country’s	PFM	can	be	benchmarked	aganst	good	practce,	ths	wll	help	polcy-
makers	chart	a	relevant	reform	course	that	wll	move	the	country	forward	towards	
more	effectve	and	sustaned	use	of	publc	resources.	Thus	the	PEFA	framework	has	
a developmental as well as a fiduciary dimension.
The	PEFA	Performance	Framework	contans	28	ndcators	dvded	nto	three	sets.	
The first four look at aggregate expenditure and revenue out-turns relative to the 
orgnal	budget,	as	a	measure	of	ts	credblty.	The	second	set	of	sx	ndcators	looks	
at	cross-cuttng	ssues	of	comprehensveness	and	transparency.	The	thrd	set,	of	18	
indicators, looks at the budget cycle, including whether the budget reflects govern-
ment	polcy	prortes,	whether	there	s	predctablty	and	control	n	budget	execu-
tion, the quality of accounting, recording and reporting and, finally, external scrutiny 
and	audt.
A	summary	of	the	full	ndcator	set	s	gven	n	Table	11.1.
11.3 SummaryofPEFAassessmentforNigeria
The	PEFA	dagnostc	has	revealed	a	trend	toward	a	system-wde	upgrade	n	Ngera’s	
PFM system, which reflects strong government reform commitment. In more than 
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Table 11.1	 PEFA	ndcator	set
A. PFM out-turns: credibility of the budget 
PI-1	 Aggregate	expendture	out-turn	compared	to	orgnal	approved	budget	
PI-2	 Composton	of	expendture	out-turn	compared	to	orgnal	approved	budget	
PI-3	 Aggregate	revenue	out-turn	compared	to	orgnal	approved	budget	
PI-4	 Stock	and	montorng	of	expendture	payment	arrears	
B. Key cross-cutting issues: comprehensiveness and transparency 
PI-5	 Classification of the budget 
PI-6	 Comprehensveness	of	nformaton	ncluded	n	budget	documentaton	
PI-7	 Extent	of	unreported	government	operatons	
PI-8	 Transparency of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
PI-9	 Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities
PI-10	 Public access to key fiscal information 
C. Budget cycle 
	 C()	Polcy-based	budgetng	
PI-11 Orderlness	and	partcpaton	n	the	annual	budget	process	
PI-12	 Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting 
	 C()	Predctablty	and	control	n	budget	executon	
PI-13	 Transparency	of	taxpayer	oblgatons	and	labltes	
PI-14	 Effectveness	of	measures	for	taxpayer	regstraton	and	tax	assessment	
PI-15	 Effectveness	n	collecton	of	tax	payments	
PI-16	 Predctablty	n	the	avalablty	of	funds	for	commtment	of	expendtures	
PI-17	 Recordng	and	management	of	cash	balances,	debt	and	guarantees	
PI-18	 Effectveness	of	payroll	controls	
PI-19	 Competton,	value	for	money	and	controls	n	procurement	
PI-20	 Effectveness	of	nternal	controls	for	non-salary	expendture	
PI-21	 Effectveness	of	nternal	audt	
	 C()	Accountng,	recordng	and	reportng	
PI-22	 Tmelness	and	regularty	of	accounts	reconclaton	
PI-23	 Avalablty	of	nformaton	on	resources	receved	by	servce	delvery	unts	
PI-24	 Qualty	and	tmelness	of	n-year	budget	reports	
PI-25	 Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements 
	 C(v)	External	scrutny	and	audt	
PI-26	 Scope,	nature	and	follow-up	of	external	audt	
PI-27	 Legslatve	scrutny	of	the	annual	budget	law	
PI-28	 Legslatve	scrutny	of	external	audt	reports	
half	of	28	PEFA	 ndvdual	areas,	both	performance	and	underlyng	systems	have	
mproved	notceably	over	the	last	few	years.	However,	because	the	ntal	pre-reform	
level	was	extremely	low,	even	after	several	years	of	reforms	Ngera’s	PFM	system	
remans	fundamentally	fragle.
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The	assessment	also	found	that	the	Federal	Government	of	Ngera	(FGN)	made	
advances	n	macroeconomc	and	debt	management,	budget	formulaton,	accountng,	
and	procurement	reform.	However,	less	progress	was	made	wth	respect	to	capacty	
building, including in the Budget Office, and in such areas of financial accountability 
as	reportng,	montorng	and	dsclosure.
The key findings of this report with respect to financial accountability systems 
could	be	summarzed	as	follows:
Poltcal	commtment	to	the	reform	process	s	strong	wthn	the	top	level	of	the	
government,	although	n	some	areas	ths	has	yet	to	translate	nto	a	fully	artculated	
development	plan.	
The	reform	programme	s	stll	n	ts	ntal	stages,	but	ts	mpact	has	already	been	
significant on particular aspects of the PFM operations.
Whle	most	 areas	 of	 PFM	 contnue	 to	 show	weaknesses,	 these	weaknesses	 n	
most	cases	are	recognzed	by	the	government,	and	approprate	reform	efforts	are	
ether	ongong	or	planned.
Overall, despite recent progress, the fiduciary assurance environment in the FGN 
remans	weak.
Thus,	a	pecular	feature	of	the	current	PFM	stuaton	n	Ngera	s	that	for	a	number	
of	ndcators/areas	performance	s	mprovng	but	s	stll	qute	weak.	Such	ndcators	
include budget classification, the comprehensiveness of budget documentation, pub-
lc	access	to	budget	nformaton,	the	transparency	of	taxpayer	oblgatons,	the	effec-
tveness	of	taxpayer	regstraton,	the	management	of	cash	balances	and	debts,	and	the	
qualty	of	n-year	budget	reportng.
At	 the	 same	 tme,	 for	a	number	of	 ndcators,	performance	 remans	weak,	and	
lttle	or	no	materal	progress	has	been	made	recently.	These	 nclude	 the	 ncdence	
of government spending that remains off budget; the consolidation of fiscal data for 
enlarged government; the oversight of fiscal risk related to the operations of state 
enterprses;	the	control	and	collecton	of	tax	arrears;	the	predctablty	of	government	
fundng;	the	avalablty	of	nformaton	on	funds	receved	by	servce	provders;	the	
tmelness	and	qualty	of	annual	accounts;	and	qualty/depth	of	legslatve	scrutny	
of	the	budget.
Moreover,	the	reforms	that	promse	to	advance	budget	transparency	and	expend-
ture efficiency, including those in procurement, have been much slower at the sub-
natonal	level,	where	more	than	half	of	consoldated	budget	expendtures	are	admn-
stered.	
Given the constitutional autonomy of state governments in fiscal and financial 
management	matters,	the	FGN	can	do	lttle	by	way	of	drect	nterventon.	Instead,	
the	FGN	 should	 look	 for	 an	 alternatve,	more	 cooperatve	 approach	 for	 engagng	
the	states	n	PFM	reforms	by	provdng	them	wth	techncal	assstance,	gvng	them	
financial incentives, and generating political benefits for sub-national leaders that are 
eager	to	reform.
•
•
•
•
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11.4 Nigeria’sperformanceagainsttheindividualindicators
11.4.1 PI-1:Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved
budget
The standard here is defined in terms of the extent to which the budget as executed 
over	the	past	three	years	devates	from	the	budget	as	approved,	and	s	based	upon	
prmary	expendture,	n	other	words	t	excludes	debt	servce,	and	also	excludes	ex-
ternally	funded	project	expendture.
There	are	several	reasons	for	wantng	as	lttle	devaton	as	possble	between	the	
budget	ex ante and	the	budget	ex post. The first is predictability of funding for budget 
users,	the	mnstres,	departments	and	agences	whch	delver	servces.	A	second	s	
macroeconomc	management.	Thrd	 s	democratc	accountablty,	 n	 the	sense	 that	
the	budget	s	a	contract	to	execute	polces	and	undertake	functons	between	the	ex-
ecutve	and	the	legslature	as	authorzer	of	revenues	and	spendng.	Here	the	federal	
government’s	performance	has	been	mprovng,	but	from	a	very	low	base.	In	2003	
total	 spendng,	 excludng	debt	 servce,	 fell	 short	 by	38.3	per	 cent	 of	 approprated	
spending, chiefly because capital releases were 71.4 per cent less than the approved 
budget.	Ths	was	partly	because	 total	 revenues	were	9.1	per	 cent	 less	 than	antc-
pated, but chiefly because the legislature in approving the budget more than doubled 
the capital budget relative to what the executive proposed, much of it on unjustified 
pork-barrel	projects.	Ths	left	the	executve	no	alternatve	but	to	restrct	releases	to	
avoid an exploding budget deficit. 
Ths	pattern	repeated	tself	the	followng	two	years,	but	n	a	less	extreme	way,	
as	the	executve	has	ntroduced	pre-budget	consultatons	wth	the	legslature	on	the	
overall	macroeconomc	framework	wthn	whch	budgets	must	be	made	and	execut-
ed.	Overall,	the	average	expendture	devaton	n	2004–05	declned	to	only	5.3	per	
cent,	whereas	t	exceeded	28	per	cent	n	2001–03.	Even	so,	the	federal	government	
falls	a	 long	way	short	of	acceptable	standards	of	budget	predctablty,	and	 ths	 s	
one of the factors that contribute to the inefficiency of spending. State governments 
show	a	smlar	msmatch	between	approved	and	executed	budgets,	but	 ths	 s	 less	
due	to	state	legslatures	expandng	the	governor’s	budget,	and	more	about	governors	
proposing ambitious capital programs and being unable to either finance or execute 
them.
The	 underlyng	 need	 at	 the	 natonal	 level	 s	 to	 reach	 greater	 accord	 between	
the	executve	and	 the	 legslature	on	 the	sze	and	content	of	budgets.	Unlke	other	
countres	n	sub-Saharan	Afrca,	whch	have	evolved	ther	budget	systems	from	an	
orgnal	Westmnster	model,	n	Ngera	there	are	no	restrctons	on	the	ablty	of	the	
legslature	to	change	the	presdent’s	budget.	For	some	observers	ths	s	a	dangerous	
flaw in Nigeria’s constitutional arrangements, given that more than three quarters 
of	government	revenues	derve	not	from	taxes	on	ctzens	(whch	would	constran	
lawmakers)	but	from	ol.	For	others,	the	power	to	change	the	executve’s	budget	s	
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fundamental to the principle of separation of powers. In practical terms, fiscal man-
agement	and	effectve	budget	executon	are	mpossble	f	 large	expendture	deva-
tons	persst.	The	draft	Fscal	Responsblty	Law,	whch	seeks	to	bnd	governments	
at	all	levels	to	makng	budgets	conservatvely	on	the	bass	of	an	assumed	long-run	
prce	of	ol	s	a	vtal	component	of	better	budgetng	arrangements.	So	also	are	the	
efforts in recent years of the Budget Office of the Federation to brief the National 
Assembly on the fiscal outlook, and seek their support for budgets made within a 
Medum	Term	Expendture	Framework	(MTEF).	
11.4.2 PI-2: Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original
approvedbudget
Ths	ndcator	measures	the	extent	to	whch	actual	expendture	composton	vares	
from	the	composton	of	 the	orgnal	budget.	The	 ratonale	of	 the	 ndcator	 s	 that	
budgets	should	be	capable	of	mplementng	the	polces	and	programmes	proposed	
by	the	executve	and	approved	by	the	legslature.
At	 the	 federal	 level	 there	 s	 relatvely	 lttle	devaton	between	 the	 share	of	 the	
man	sector	mnstres,	departments	and	agences	(MDAs)	n	the	approved	and	the	
executed	budget.	Furthermore,	any	devatons	that	can	be	measured	are	dwarfed	by	
the	 large	devatons	at	 the	aggregate	 level.	Ths	suggests	 that,	when	 the	executve	
cuts	the	budget	back	from	what	t	vews	as	the	unsustanably	hgh	levels	approved	by	
the	legslature,	the	pan	s	shared	equally	–	no	mnstry	s	dsproportonally	protected	
from	t.	
What	the	ndcator	does	not	measure	s	reallocatons	wthn	MDA	budgets.	Ths	
s	large.	When	budgets	are	cut,	the	wage	bll	s	protected	at	the	expense	of	operatons	
and maintenance spending, and this contributes to inefficiency. There is also redis-
trbuton	wthn	the	captal	budget,	as	funds	are	drected	towards	what	the	executve	
regards	as	hgher-prorty	projects.	When	ths	results	n	the	completon	rather	than	
partial implementation of projects, the reallocations are efficiency enhancing. How-
ever,	the	latter	has	not	been	common	budget	executon	practce	n	Ngera.	A	smlar	
pattern	can	be	found	at	the	state	level.
11.4.3 PI-3: Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved
budget
Ths	ndcator	measures	the	realsm	of	government	revenue	projectons,	and	the	n-
ternational standard defined in the PEFA framework is for actual revenue collections 
not	to	fall	below	97	per	cent	of	budgeted	domestc	revenues	n	more	than	one	of	the	
past	three	years.
Ngera’s	record	n	recent	years	has	been	one	of	exceedng	domestc	revenue	fore-
casts, chiefly thanks to unexpectedly high international oil prices. But this was due 
more	to	luck	than	good	plannng.	If	ol	revenues	are	set	to	one	sde	and	devatons	n	
non-ol	tax	collectons	are	analysed,	a	rather	dfferent	pcture	emerges.	In	both	2003	
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and	2004	the	actual	nternally	generated	revenue	(IGR)	collected	amounted	to	only	
about	one	thrd	of	the	budgeted	level.	Ths	ponts	to	weak	collecton	and	unrealstc	
budgetng.	
A	smlar	pattern	of	weak	IGR	collecton	shows	up	at	the	state	level,	wth	a	few	
exceptons.	Lagos	State	has	made	dramatc	mprovements	n	IGR	snce	the	transton	
from	mltary	rule,	by	contractng	out	collectons,	albet	at	a	hgh	overhead	cost.	Now	
the	state	 s	 tryng	to	 nsttutonalze	sound	tax	admnstraton	n	 the	newly	formed	
Bureau	of	Internal	Revenue.	
11.4.4 PI-4:Stockandmonitoringofexpenditurepaymentarrears
PEFA	best	practce	benchmarks	two	varables:	()	the	stock	of	arrears,	whch	should	
be	below	2	per	cent	of	total	expendture,	and	()	relable	and	complete	data	on	the	
stock	of	arrears	generated	through	routne	procedures,	regularly	updated.
Hgh	levels	of	arrears	are	a	consequence	of	large	devatons	between	the	approved	
and	executed	budget,	and	n	Ngera’s	case	there	s	a	backlog	nherted	from	the	years	
of	mltary	msrule,	for	whch	the	data	are	unrelable.	By	late	2005,	total	arrears	at	
the	federal	level	were	estmated	at	not	less	than	400	bllon	nara	($3	bllon),	whch	
was	more	 than	20	per	cent	of	 the	 total	2005	federal	government	budget	spendng.	
The	man	categores	of	budget	arrears	presently	are	debts	to	contractors	and	over-
due	penson	payments.	There	are	also	arrears	on	utlty	payments	and	payments	to	
nternatonal	organzatons.	Total	contractors’	arrears	are	estmated	at	275–300	bl-
lon	nara	(about	2.2	per	cent	of	2005	GDP),	and	have	been	the	subject	of	successve	
screenng	exercses.	Consderable	progress	has	been	made	n	buldng	up	a	database	
in the Budget Office of the Federation (BOF), verifying, auditing and deflating the 
reported	clams.	Small	contractor	arrears	are	n	the	process	of	beng	pad	off;	large	
contractor	arrears	are	beng	securtzed.
Penson	arrears	have	accumulated	under	the	FGN’s	tradtonal	pay-as-you-go	de-
fined benefit scheme for public servants, and pension rolls have long been unreliable. 
In	2004	the	Penson	Act	provded	for	 the	 ntroducton	of	funded	penson	schemes	
across	the	publc	sector,	and	the	establshment	of	a	Natonal	Penson	Commsson,	
which has begun a verification exercise. The 2006 FGN budget set aside funds for 
clearng	most	federal	penson	arrears.	
11.4.5 PI-5: Classification of the budget
Best	practce	s	the	operaton	of	budget	systems	that	are	based	on	the	admnstratve,	
economic and sub-functional/programme classifications, using Government Finan-
cial Statistics/Classification of Functions of Government	standards.
Nigeria’s budgets at all levels of government employ traditional classification 
systems, which are based mainly on administrative classifications and some econom-
ic classifications. In this way the country has lagged behind international develop-
ments	that	have	seen	the	emergence	and	adopton	of	unversal	standards	whch,	wth	
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modern	 nformaton	 technology,	 can	 provde	 polcy-makers	 and	 budget	managers	
wth	nformaton	on	PFM	n	a	tmely	and	more	meanngful	way.	Furthermore,	the	
broader budgeting, reporting and accounting system, of which the classification sys-
tem	forms	a	central	part,	has	deterorated	n	ts	applcaton	over	the	years.	The	budget	
estmates	are	mostly	too	detaled	for	legslatve	oversght,	and	the	accounts	are	too	
coarse-grained for management purposes, while the classification system allows no 
functonal	analyss.
As	long	as	the	prmary	objectve	of	PFM	mprovements	s	better	control	of	spend-
ing by budget units, an administrative-based classification system serves. And the 
most	urgent	need	s	better	n-year	reportng	by	MDAs	under	the	present	system.	But,	
as	the	polcy	behnd	spendng	becomes	more	mportant,	a	more	modern	budget	clas-
sification system will be demanded. Some steps are now being taken, partly by the 
Accountant-General	of	the	Federaton,	to	mprove	reportng	(through	the	Accountng	
Transacton	Reportng	and	Recordng	System	(ATRRS)),	and	to	amend	the	exstng	
chart of accounts. Also the introduction of integrated financial management systems 
n	some	states	on	ther	own	account	s	promptng	change.	
11.4.6 PI-6: Comprehensiveness of information included in budget
documentation
A	best-practce	budget	wll	provde	nformaton	on	the	macroeconomc	assumptons	
underlying the budget, the fiscal deficit defined by international standards and financ-
ing, financial assets at the beginning of the year and prior years’ out-turns, explana-
tions of the budgetary implications of new policies, tax expenditures and fiscal risk, 
summaries of budget data, including institutional, economic and functional classifi-
caton,	as	well	as	detals	of	proposed	spendng	at	an	approprate	level	of	detal.
Currently	the	package	of	documents	that	consttutes	the	FGN’s	budget	lacks	ana-
lytcal	tables,	and	summares	have	become	more	cursory	n	recent	years,	a	vctm	of	
the	rush	to	complete	the	budget	and	the	lack	of	n-depth	capacty	n	the	BOF.	The	
budget	stresses	government	prortes	such	as	the	Ngera	Economc	Empowerment	
and	Development	Strategy	(NEEDS)	but	does	not	explan	well	how	these	are	trans-
lated	nto	spendng	allocatons.	In	other	respects,	the	FGN	s	movng	forward.	It	has	
begun the development of a medium-term fiscal framework for the budget, which 
wll	eventually	evolve	nto	a	fuller	Medum	Term	Expendture	Framework	(MTEF).	
A	crtcal	step	towards	lnkng	these	better	has	been	the	recent	requrement	for	mn-
stres	to	prepare	Medum	Term	Sectoral	Strateges	(MTSS).
The	budget	presentaton	has	changed	 lttle	 n	decades,	wth	a	gap	between	 the	
budget	speech,	whch	s	very	aggregate,	and	the	mass	of	detal	n	the	estmates	but	
wthout	analytcal	summary	tables.	Such	an	unbalanced	presentaton	stmulates	leg-
islators (who need little prompting) to ignore the underlying fiscal strategy of the 
submtted	budget	proposal	and	mmerse	themselves	n	the	detals	of	spendng.
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11.4.7 PI-7:Extentofunreportedgovernmentoperations
Governments	should	am	for	comprehensve	budgets	and	accounts	that	cover	all	rev-
enue and expenditure flows for all institutional units that are part of that government 
ter	to	whch	the	budget	pertans.	In	practcal	terms	ths	means	ensurng	that	unre-
ported	extra-budgetary	expendture	(other	than	donor-funded	projects,	whch	can	be	
difficult to capture) is insignificant (below 1 per cent of total expenditure). 
As already noted in this chapter, a significant proportion (42 per cent of non-inter-
est	expendture	on	average	n	the	past	three	years)	of	spendng	by	federal	enttes	les	
outsde	the	federal	budget.	Ths	serously	undermnes	the	comprehensveness	of	the	
annual budget. The main categories of spending outside the budget are: (i) first line 
charges of the Federation Accounts (chiefly investment costs of NNPC), (ii) donor 
funds, and (iii) expenditure financed with MDA’s own revenues. In 2005 settlement 
of	external	debt	arrears	as	part	of	the	hstorc	Pars	debt	deal	was	extra-budgetary.	
Snce	 2005	 a	 further	 category	 has	 been	 added	 –	major	 nfrastructure	 nvestments	
(prmarly	power)	funded	wth	money	that	s	accumulated	n	the	excess	ol	savngs	
account.	
Constitutional interpretation and budgetary principles appear to be in conflict 
wth	 respect	 to	 ths	 extra-budgetary	 spendng.	 In	partcular,	NNPC	cash	calls	 and	
debt	relef	payments	are	common	purpose	spendng	made	by	federal	government	en-
ttes,	whch	the	Supreme	Court	n	2002	determned	were	outsde	the	federal	govern-
ment’s	jursdcton.	As	a	result,	a	separate	approval	procedure	has	been	establshed	
for	ths	spendng,	nvolvng	the	Federaton	Account	Allocaton	Commttee	(FAAC),	
the	Federal	Executve	Councl	(FEC)	and	the	Natonal	Assembly,	wth	audtng	by	
the	Audtor-General	of	the	Federaton.	However,	ths	results	n	a	segmented	expend-
ture	process,	and	makes	t	 less	transparent	and	accountable.	A	possble	soluton	to	
ths	problem	could	be	ncorporaton	of	such	common	purpose	spendng	n	the	regular	
FGN’s	budget,	perhaps	as	a	separate	part.
Including donor-financed spending in the budget is a problem in many poor coun-
tres,	and	n	the	case	of	Ngera	s	perhaps	a	lesser	problem	because	the	magntude	of	
donor assistance in relative terms is not so great. Still, it would be prudent to reflect at 
least	all	government	external	borrowng	n	the	budget.	More	mportantly,	the	falure	
to	 nclude	 the	own	 revenues	of	parastatals,	whch	are	partly	dependent	on	budget	
transfers,	n	the	budget,	even	f	only	for	nformaton	rather	than	appropraton,	does	
undermne	the	transparency	and	accountablty	of	the	budget	system.	A	smlar	stu-
aton	exsts	at	the	state	level.
11.4.8 PI-8: Transparency of intergovernmental fiscal relations
The	goal	here	s	a	rule-based,	transparent	and	predctable	system	for	the	allocaton	
of	funds	between	dfferent	ters	of	government,	enablng	sub-natonal	governments	
to	make	realstc	projectons	for	federal	transfers,	and	that	actual	releases	durng	the	
year	are	made	n	a	regular	and	predctable	way.	For	earmarked	transfers,	there	should	
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be	a	means,	ether	 though	publshed	accounts	or	statstcal	surveys,	 to	ensure	 that	
these have been used for their intended purpose by their ultimate beneficiaries.
The	 dvson	 of	 responsbltes	 s	 generally	 set	 out	 n	 the	 1999	 consttuton,	
whch	descrbes	 the	 exclusve	 responsblty	of	 the	FGN	 for	 functons	of	natonal	
concern,	lke	defence	and	foregn	affars,	concurrent	responsbltes	of	federal	and	
state	governments,	such	as	secondary	and	tertary	educaton,	and	responsbltes	of	
local	government	authortes	(LGAs)	such	as	water	and	santaton,	together	wth	re-
sponsbltes	such	as	prmary	educaton	and	health	whch	LGAs	may	cooperate	wth	
state	governments	n	delverng.	Overall,	there	s	consderable	overlap	n	expendture	
responsibilities and insufficient clarity of expenditure mandates.
The	bulk	of	revenues	for	all	three	ters	of	government	derve	from	ol.	Ol	rev-
enues	and	natonally	collected	taxes	are	channelled	to	the	three	ters	through	the	Fed-
eraton	and	VAT	Accounts,	accordng	to	a	formula	approved	by	both	houses	of	the	
Natonal	Assembly,	and	overseen	by	the	Revenue	Moblzaton,	Allocaton	and	Fscal	
Commsson	(RMAFC).	The	formula	takes	specal	account	of	such	factors	as	popula-
ton,	socal	development,	revenue	effort,	land	mass	and	terran,	as	well	as	equalty	n	
dstrbuton.	Ol-producng	states	receve	an	addtonal	‘dervaton’	allocaton.	Not	
unexpectedly,	 the	formula	s	hotly	debated	and	zealously	watched.	The	formula	s	
supposed to be updated every five years on the basis of proposals developed by the 
RMAFC,	but	ths	dd	not	take	place	recently	on	grounds	of	lack	of	consensus.
The flow of transfers is generally predictable and transparent. There are two is-
sues, however, which affect transparency. The first is prior deductions from the Fed-
eraton	Account,	 both	 statutory	deductons	 and	 jont	venture	 cash	calls	of	NNPC,	
and	admnstratvely	determned	deductons	such	as	the	set-asde	‘excess	crude’	rev-
enues,	and	the	domestc	petroleum	subsdy.	As	already	noted,	there	are	arrangements	
for	oversght	of	these	deductons,	but	they	are	not	part	of	the	annual	budget	process	
of	the	federal	Government.	There	has	also	been	lack	of	transparency	over	the	genera-
ton	of	ol	revenues,	but	ths	s	mprovng	wth	Ngera’s	partcpaton	n	the	Extrac-
tve	Industres’	Transparency	Intatve	(EITI).	The	second	ssue	whch	detracts	from	
the	transparency	and	predctablty	of	the	ntergovernmental	transfer	process	s	the	
poorly	regulated	wthholdng	by	state	governments	of	transfers	to	local	governments	
for	the	executon	of	jont	programmes.	
11.4.9 PI-9: Oversight of aggregate fiscal riskfromotherpublicsectorentities
Best practice is centralized oversight of fiscal risk through timely reports and audited 
accounts	 from	all	major	autonomous	agences	and	publc	enterprses,	 rules	whch	
prevent sub-national governments from generating fiscal liabilities for the central 
government, regular monitoring of the net fiscal position of all levels of sub-national 
government, and regular consolidation of these reports into an overall fiscal risk as-
sessment	by	the	central	government.
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There are presently several sources of risk to Nigeria’s public finances. While 
the country’s large parastatal sector is required by law to present accounts and finan-
cal	statements	to	state	and	federal	audtors-general,	submssons	are	often	late,	and	
there are no regular in-year financial reports, a matter of serious concern, given the 
generally	weak	performance	of	budget-dependent	autonomous	agences	and	publc	
enterprses,	whch	have	shown	an	alarmng	tendency	over	tme	to	accumulate	large	
debts	and	other	labltes.
A second source of fiscal risk is the lack of a hard budget constraint on state gov-
ernments and the absence of a mechanism for monitoring their fiscal positions. In the 
first years of the return to civilian rule, many states borrowed heavily from domestic 
financial markets, short-term and at high cost, and, until rising oil prices improved 
ther	revenues,	servcng	ths	debt	dstorted	budgets	and	n	many	cases	led	to	arrears	
in salaries and other payments. The third source of fiscal risk, obviously, is the heavy 
dependence	of	governments	 n	Ngera	on	 revenues	 from	ol	and	 the	attendant	ol	
prce	cycle.	
Of vital importance to the management of fiscal risk at all levels is the outcome 
of current efforts to put in place a new legal framework for public financial man-
agement,	 and	 thus	a	more	 responsble	budget	process.	Crtcal	here	are	 the	Fscal	
Responsblty	Bll	(FRB),	the	Budget	Procedure	Bll,	and	amendments	to	the	1958	
Fnance	(Control	and	Management)	Act	(F(C&M)A).	As	currently	drafted,	the	FRB,	
which includes the fiscal rule that budgets should be made on the basis of the long-
run	prce	of	ol,	s	ntended	to	be	bndng	on	states	and	LGAs.	Progressve	states	are	
begnnng	to	look	at	how	the	state	level	budget	process	could	be	strengthened,	but	
there	are	not	yet	explct	state	equvalents	to	the	F(C&M)A.
11.4.10 PI-10: Public access to key fiscal information
The	standard	here	s	the	publc	avalablty	of	a	complete	budget	package	as	soon	as	
t	s	tabled	n	the	legslature,	of	n-year	budget	executon	reports,	tmely	year-end	au-
dited financial statements, external audit reports, and regular publication of contract 
awards	above	$100,000.
Here	Ngera	scores	very	poorly;	there	s	very	lttle	nformaton	on	Ngera’s	gov-
ernment finances that is available to the public on a timely basis. This may be be-
cause	the	nformaton	does	not	exst,	or	s	not	complete	or	avalable	n	a	tmely	way.	
Alternatvely,	t	can	be	that	authortes	decde	not	to	release	nformaton	because	of	
ts	supposed	senstve	nature.	Some	mprovement	s	takng	place.	The	Central	Bank	
published summaries of the budget aggregates and related financial information, and 
both	the	Federal	Mnstry	of	Fnance	(FMoF)	and	the	BOF	now	have	webstes,	and	
the	amount	of	nformaton,	partcularly	n	the	Central	Bank	ste,	s	growng.	In	add-
ton,	there	s	now	an	actve	consortum	of	publc	polcy	NGOs	n	Ngera	demandng	
more transparent public finances. This is encouraging; at bottom the challenge is to 
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develop a culture amongst government officials to regularly release and not with-
hold the type of information on government finances that is normal in a democratic 
country.	Partly,	the	exstng	culture	s	a	legacy	of	mltary	rule,	when	any	release	of	
information could get an official into serious trouble. It is also driven by a fear that 
release	of	any	nformaton	could	be	msrepresented	for	poltcal	gan.	The	soluton	to	
leaks	and	dstorton	of	released	nformaton	s,	of	course,	regular	and	tmely	publca-
ton	of	a	much	wder	range	of	publc	nformaton,	wthholdng	only	nformaton	that	
truly	should	be	secret,	for	ether	personal	or	securty	reasons.
11.4.11 PI-11:Orderlinessandparticipationintheannualbudgetprocess
The	am	here	 s	a	clear	and	predctable	budget	calendar	whch	gves	stakeholders	
sufficient time to participate in the budget process, communicates cabinet-approved 
budget	celngs	to	MDAs	n	the	call	crcular,	and	enables	the	legslatureto	approve	
the	budget	before	the	start	of	the	newfinancial year.
In	Ngera,	at	all	levels	of	government,	the	budget	calendar	s	an	admnstratve	
tradton,	not	set	by	law.	Whle	the	BOF	endeavours	to	complete	the	budget	estmates	
for	the	presdent	to	make	hs	budget	speech	n	md-October,	so	that	the	legslature	
can approve the next year budget by the end of the current financial year, this seldom 
happens,	ether	because	the	legslature	takes	longer,	or	because	budget	preparaton	s	
delayed.	In	recent	years,	notwthstandng	efforts	to	get	the	budget	approved	n	tme,	
the Appropriations Bill was not passed until after the first quarter of the new financial 
year,	necesstatng	provsonal	fundng	warrants.	Ths	 s	compounded	by	the	often	
fractous	 relatons	 between	 the	 executve	 and	 the	 legslature,	multple	 changes	 n	
the	budget	as	proposed	by	the	presdent,	and	multple	adjustments	to	releases	after	
the	budget	has	been	approved,	n	order,	n	the	executve’s	vew,	to	restore	balance	
to	spendng	plans.	Often	ths	has	meant	that	md-year	has	come	before	the	BOF	has	
completed	the	launch	of	the	current	year’s	budget,	postponng	yet	agan	the	goal	of	
launchng	the	next	year’s	budget	preparaton	on	an	orderly	tme	path.	Ths	results	n	
insufficient time to explain to the legislature and get their understanding of the macr-
oeconomic fundamentals underpinning public finances, to get ministers to agree col-
lectvely	to	the	budget	framework,	and	to	allow	MDAs	to	prortze	ther	spendng.	
However,	 there	 have	 been	 some	 mportant	 developments	 n	 recent	 years.	The	
BOF now makes a serious effort to explain the fiscal framework to the legislature at 
the	outset	of	the	budget	preparaton	process.	And	MDAs,	ntally	on	a	plot	bass,	
have	begun	preparng	ther	Medum	Term	Sector	Strateges	(MTSS),	wth	the	help	of	
consultants,	as	an	effort	to	get	resources	better	focused	on	polcy	prortes	pror	to	
detailed budget preparation. For the first time, the BOF was able to undertake these 
actons	and	get	the	2007	budget	placed	before	the	Natonal	Assembly	by	the	mddle	
of	October.
At	the	state	level,	wth	the	governor	domnatng	executve–legslature	relatons	
and	wth	greater	scope	for	patronage,	there	s	typcally	not	the	contentous	relaton-
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shp	that	characterzes	relatons	at	the	federal	level.	Ths	enables	budgets	to	be	sub-
mtted	on	tme,	and	generally	passed	before	or	shortly	after	the	end	of	the	current	
financial year. But other problems manifest themselves, such as unrealistic budget 
estmates,	poorly	coordnated	current	and	captal	budgets,	poor	qualty	publc	nvest-
ment	plans,	and	slow	executon.	
Three	developments	are	crucal	to	nsttutonalzng	a	more	orderly	and	partc-
patory budget process. The first is the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, 
and	assocated	PFM	legslaton	at	federal	and	state	levels.	The	second	s	rasng	the	
capacty	of	BOF	staff	 (and	ther	counterparts	 n	state	budget	and	plannng	depart-
ments).	The	thrd	s	more	harmonous	relatons	between	the	executve	and	the	leg-
slature	at	the	natonal	level	on	budget	matters.	The	last	of	these	s	partly	structural,	
and therefore difficult to change, partly a matter of political incentives of elected 
officials who seek to add programmes they can be associated with to budgets, and 
partly	amenable	to	better	communcatons	and	stronger	accountablty	arrangements,	
whch	have	begun	to	mprove.	
11.4.12 PI-12: Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and 
budgeting
Best practice is three-year or more rolling forecasts of fiscal aggregates, on which 
annual	budgets	are	based,	annual	debt	sustanablty	analyses	for	both	domestc	and	
external	debt,	exstence	of	sector	strateges	wth	full	costng	of	recurrent	and	nvest-
ment spending, broadly consistent with fiscal forecasts, and selection of investments 
based	upon	ther	relevance	to	sector	strateges	and	recurrent	cost	mplcatons,	and	
consstent	wth	sector	envelopes	and	forward	budget	estmates.
Here	the	federal	government	s	well	ahead	of	states.	In	the	past	three	years,	the	
BOF has prepared multi-year aggregate fiscal frameworks, based upon conserva-
tve	estmates	of	the	expected	prce	of	ol,	and	used	ths	framework	to	bref	both	the	
legslature	and	the	Federal	Executve	Councl	on	the	forthcomng	budget	preparaton	
cycle.	The	BOF,	as	yet,	has	not	effectvely	evolved	 the	aggregate	 framework	 nto	
a	set	of	medum-term	sector	envelopes	based	upon	the	cost	of	exstng	and	agreed	
future	polcy,	though	the	launchng	of	the	MTSS	process	s	an	mportant	step	n	ths	
drecton.	In	the	jargon	of	budget-makng,	at	the	federal	level,	Ngera	has	an	MTFF	
but	not	an	MTEF.	
At	the	state	level,	mult-year	budget	plannng	s	less	advanced.	Although	a	few	
states	have	evnced	nterest	 n	gvng	a	medum-term	perspectve	to	budgetng,	all	
effectively make budgets on an annual basis, and the culture of budgeting is firmly 
rooted	n	the	old	dual	budget	rollng	publc	nvestment	plan	model.	
The	challenge	s	movng	from	the	dual	budget	model,	n	whch	nvestment	spend-
ng	domnates,	to	one	n	whch	servce	delvery	gudes	the	makng	of	budgets.	Ths	
requres	lookng	at	budgets	n	a	much	more	ntegrated	way,	balancng	captal	wth	re-
current	spendng	wthn	an	overall	sector	(or	MDA)	resources	envelope.	Techncally,	
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ths	requres	much	better	nformaton	on	costs	of	servce	delvery	and	these	must	be	
generated, as also must information on the efficiency and effectiveness of spend-
ng	(whch	s	very	poor	at	present).	It	also	requres	a	major	nvestment	n	capacty	
building of budget staff, both in budget offices and in line ministries, at all levels of 
government.	Most	of	all,	t	requres	a	sea	change	n	the	culture	of	publc	spendng	n	
Ngera,	n	a	way	that	makes	the	consstent	delvery	of	core	publc	servces	the	drver	
of	spendng	decsons,	rather	than	ambtous,	poorly	thought-through,	badly	executed	
and	often	unsustanable	captal	spendng	schemes.	
11.4.13 PI-13:Transparencyoftaxpayerobligationsandliabilities
Taxpayer	labltes	need	to	be	spelled	out	n	clear	and	comprehensve	laws	and	regu-
latons,	backed	up	by	effectve	 taxpayer	educaton	and	a	properly	 functonng	 tax	
appeals	mechansm.
Evdence	from	enterprse	surveys	suggests	that	tax	regulatons	and	how	they	are	
appled	are	a	constrant	to	busness	development,	crtera	for	tax	wavers	are	unclear	
n	ther	applcaton,	and	taxpayer	educaton	has	a	long	way	to	go	at	both	federal	and	
state	levels.	Tax	appeals	mechansms	exst	but	they	are	complex	and	ther	effectve-
ness is difficult to assess. 
Actions to remedy these deficiencies are under way. The Federal Internal Rev-
enue	Servce	(FIRS)	has	ntated	a	package	of	legslatve	amendments	to	tax	laws,	
remedyng	some	of	the	exstng	faults	n	VAT,	such	as	the	absence	of	a	regstraton	
threshold, improvements to the appeals mechanisms, and a clearer definition of the 
tmetable	for	dspute	resoluton.	There	s	also	a	need	to	smplfy	the	overall	tax	struc-
ture,	ncludng	subnatonal	taxes	and	fees,	to	elmnate	varous	secondary	taxes	that	
brng	lttle	revenue	but	generate	consderable	admnstratve	cost	to	the	prvate	sec-
tor.	A	further	challenge	s	buldng	the	capacty	of	staff.
11.4.14 PI-14: Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax
assessment
The	focus	of	ths	ndcator	s	on	the	exstence	and	accuracy	of	controls	n	the	taxpayer	
regstraton	system,	effectveness	of	penaltes	for	non-complance	wth	tax	regstra-
ton,	and	adequate	plannng	and	montorng	of	tax	audts	and	fraud	nvestgatons.
Coordnaton	between	FIRS	headquarters	 and	 ts	branches	 n	 the	 states,	whch	
are	responsble	for	regsterng	taxpayers,	s	weak,	leadng	to	naccuraces	n	taxpayer	
nformaton	and	consequently	n	tax	collectons.	There	s	no	sngle	taxpayer	regster	
yet.	Non-complance	penaltes	are	ether	 too	 low	 to	consttute	an	 ncentve	or	 too	
complex	 to	be	 effectve.	The	 recently	 establshed	audt	 departments	of	FIRS	 lack	
capacty,	and	wth	no	systematc	collecton	of	tax	data,	let	alone	ndustry	data,	the	
process of risk identification cannot be begun.
Efforts	are	under	way	to	construct	a	sngle	taxpayer	database	whch	wll	be	com-
puterized, enabling the adoption of a single Tax Identification Number (TIN). This 
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needs	to	be	accompaned	by	valdaton	of	exstng	taxpayer	data	and	buldng	of	staff	
capacty,	especally	for	audt.	
11.4.15 PI-15:Effectivenessincollectionoftaxpayments
Best practice is defined as a high ratio of collection of tax arrears relative to their 
stock,	regular	transfers	of	collected	taxes	from	a	revenue	authorty	to	treasury,	and	
accounts	reconclaton	between	tax	assessments,	collectons,	arrears	records	and	re-
cepts	by	the	treasury.
Present	arrangements	n	Ngera	fall	below	the	standard.	There	s	no	database	on	
tax	arrears	classfyng	arrears	by	amounts	and	tax	type	at	the	levels	of	the	Federaton	
and	states	(whch	collect	Personal	Income	Tax),	whle	reconclatons	are	ncomplete	
and	less	than	regular.	At	the	federal	level,	there	are	reforms	under	way	n	FIRS,	as	
well	as	n	the	state	wth	the	largest	tax	base,	Lagos.	Over	tme,	as	staff	capacty	and	
better	systems	are	bult,	ths	should	lead	to	mproved	performance.	Autonomous	sta-
tus	of	revenue	agences,	whch	s	proposed	n	recent	legslaton,	s	mportant	to	make	
staff	 salares	more	 compettve	 than	 regular	 cvl	 servce	 scales.	Ths	would	help,	
combned	wth	better	oversght	and	governance,	to	break	the	nformal	practces	that	
have	become	embedded	n	many	areas.
11.4.16 PI-16: Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of
expenditures
For	budgets	to	be	predctable,	they	need	to	be	approved	on	tme,	respected	by	the	
executive, flexible enough to accommodate a reasonable level of fiscal uncertainty, 
and	 supported	by	 a	 cash	management	 system	 that	 ensures	 that	 the	government	 s	
never	llqud.
Analyss	of	actual	monthly	releases	to	spendng	departments	over	the	past	four	
years shows continuation of significant variability in the amounts provided by the 
treasury.	Ths	expendture	nstablty	s	only	partly	explanable	by	monthly	revenue	
variations, which have fluctuated somewhat less recently; this stabilization is in part 
thanks to oil-price-based budgeting. The introduction of an oil-price-based fiscal 
rule,	however,	has	helped	less	than	hoped	for	because	t	does	not	smooth	varatons	n	
ol	producton;	wth	domestc	petroleum	prce	controls	n	place,	budgetary	resources	
have had to be diverted to offsetting fuel subsidies that fluctuate in line with world oil 
prces.	In	addton,	on	the	expendture	sde	the	government	has	struggled	wth	cash	
management and delays in procurement certification. 
As	long	as	petroleum	subsdes	are	mantaned,	 the	budget	wll	always	be	vul-
nerable	to	prce	shocks	n	nternatonal	ol	markets.	Deepenng	the	market	for	gov-
ernment	securtes,	mproved	cash	management,	ncludng	the	adopton	of	a	sngle	
treasury	account,	mproved	procurement	capacty	on	the	part	of	MDAs,	and	approval	
of	a	realstcally	szed	budget	much	earler	n	the	year	are	the	key	steps	to	mprove	the	
predictability of funds for efficient and effective public expenditure.
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11.4.17 PI-17: Recording and management of cash balances, debt and
guarantees
In	well	functonng	PFM	systems,	domestc	and	foregn	debt	records	are	complete,	
regularly	updated,	 reconcled	 and	 reported	 to	management	on	 a	 regular	bass.	All	
cash	balances	are	calculated	daly	and	consoldated,	and	central	government’s	con-
tractng	of	loans	and	ssuance	of	guarantees	are	made	aganst	transparent	crtera	and	
fiscal targets, and all have to be approved by a single responsible government entity.
Currently,	budget	funds	are	released	to	MDAs,	whch	keep	ther	own	accounts	
wth	commercal	banks,	wthout	central	oversght.	Ths	means	 that	no	one	knows	
how	large	are	government	cash	balances	wth	the	commercal	banks,	whch	earn	no	
nterest,	makng	for	unnecessary	borrowng	by	the	treasury	from	ether	the	Central	
Bank	or	the	relatvely	thn	domestc	market	n	government	paper.	Ths	has	been	es-
pecally	costly	gven	the	hgh	level	of	domestc	nterest	rates	n	recent	years.	Ths	
makes	cash	management	one	of	the	weakest	areas	of	PFM	n	Ngera,	pontng	to	the	
need	for	tmely	ssue	of	warrants,	greater	oversght	of	cash	balances	and	eventually	
ntroducton	of	a	sngle	treasury	account,	replacng	the	Central	Bank	overdraft	facl-
ty	wth	open	market	operatons	 to	meet	 short-term	 lqudty	needs,	and	 ncreased	
ablty	of	the	government	Cash	Management	Commttee	to	reduce	varablty	n	cash	
releases.	
By	contrast,	 at	 the	 federal	 level	 the	area	of	debt	management	has	been	one	of	
strong advance, with the formation of the Debt Management Office under the FMoF 
and	ts	acquston	of	consderable	expertse	n	the	area	of	external	debt,	on	whch	
t	has	focused.	Ths	was	a	major	factor	supportng	Ngera’s	favourable	debt	relef	
terms	from	the	Pars	Club	n	2005.	Furthermore,	the	DMO	Act	of	2003	and	subse-
quent	gudelnes	lay	down	strct	rules	for	federal	MDAs,	parastatals	and	state	gov-
ernment	external	borrowng.	State	governments	can	contract	new	external	debt	only	
with the permission of the FMoF, normally given only after DMO financial analysis, 
Federal	 Executve	Councl	 and	Natonal	Assembly	 approval.	 Parastatals	 typcally	
borrow	through	the	FMoF,	whch	contracts	the	loan	and	on-lends	the	proceeds,	thus	
ensuring the amount is captured in the sovereign debt profile. State domestic borrow-
ng	must	be	consstent	wth	rules	of	the	Securty	and	Exchange	Commsson	(SEC),	
whch,	n	default,	provde	deducton	of	the	amounts	due	by	the	FMoF	from	federa-
ton	account	transfers	to	a	partcular	state.
11.4.18 PI-18:Effectivenessofpayrollcontrols
Governments	wth	good	payroll	 controls	 can	 lnk	drectly	 and	 regularly	 reconcle	
personnel records, staffing authorization and payroll systems. Changes are updated at 
least	monthly,	and	retroactve	adjustments	are	rare.	Authorty	to	change	records	and	
payroll	s	restrcted	and	results	n	an	audt	tral,	and	there	s	a	strong	system	of	annual	
payroll	audts	to	dentfy	control	weaknesses	and/or	ghost	workers.	
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The	FGN	operates	a	decentralzed	payroll	system	for	the	cvl	servce,	whereby	
MDAs	operate	ther	own	payrolls,	consstent	wth	government-wde	procedures	set	
by	the	Accountant-General.	In	theory,	the	payroll	s	lnked	to	the	personnel	records	
system,	and	the	formal	rules	are	sound.	In	practce,	some	of	the	abuse	that	became	
wdespread	under	mltary	rule	has	contnued	and,	notwthstandng	many	staff	cen-
suses,	payroll	fraud	has	not	yet	been	fully	elmnated.	The	weakest	part	of	the	payroll	
control system is the establishment list, in theory the approved staffing structure of 
each	MDA.	In	practce,	ths	has	lost	credblty,	and	the	bass	of	control	has	become	
the	payroll	alone.	Parastatals,	whose	combned	employment	exceeds	by	far	that	of	
the	cvl	servce	proper,	le	outsde	ths	system,	and	also	have	weak	payroll	controls.
A	major	effort	s	now	under	way	to	replace	the	present	largely	manual	systems	
of	the	FGN	wth	an	ntegrated	payroll	and	personnel	management	system.	Ths	s	an	
mportant	step	forward	n	strengthenng	payroll	controls.	As	t	s	ntroduced,	t	wll	
be	mportant	to	ensure	the	accuracy	of	personnel	data	entered	nto	the	new	system,	f	
necessary	through	further	staff	audts.
11.4.19 PI-19:Competition,valueformoneyandcontrolsinprocurement
The	benchmark	for	publc	procurement	s	open	rule-based	competton,	appled	to	at	
least 75 per cent of contracts above the threshold, with full justification for less com-
pettve	procurement	methods,	and	a	complants	mechansm	that	provdes	for	tmely	
resoluton	of	procurement	process	dsputes,	under	the	oversght	of	an	external	body,	
wth	publcly	accessble	data	on	complants	resoluton.
Publc	 procurement	 s	 an	 area	 where	 the	 government	 has	 made	 consderable	
progress	at	 the	federal	 level,	aganst	a	background	of	 large-scale	abuse	durng	the	
years	of	mltary	rule	of	what	was	orgnally	a	sound	process,	through	rgged,	non-
compettve	and	costly	award	of	contracts.	The	ntal	efforts	of	cvlan	government	
were	 to	deal	wth	an	overhang	of	contractors’	clams,	 reducng	or	elmnatng	 the	
most	egregous	ones.	From	2001	the	FGN	began	puttng	n	place	a	more	robust	sys-
tem	of	procurement	oversght,	through	the	nsttuton	of	‘due	process’	and	the	crea-
ton	of	the	Budget	Montorng	and	Prce	Intellgence	Unt	(BMPIU).	Departmental	
tender	boards	were	abolshed	and	replaced	wth	mnsteral	tender	boards,	subject	to	
oversght	by	BMPIU.	The	government	ntroduced	clear	rules	for	compettve	tender-
ng,	 avodance	 of	 contract	 splttng,	 natonal	 advertsng,	 and	 transparent	 bd	 and	
proposal	evaluaton	crtera.	BMPIU	has	been	hghly	successful	n	reducng	contract	
costs, and its certification of ‘due process’ is required before the release of budgetary 
funds	by	the	Accountant-General.	The	focus	thus	far	of	‘due	process’	has	been	the	
Captal	Budget.	Rules	for	drect	contractng	have	been	tghtened.
Legslaton	 s	 now	 before	 the	 Natonal	Assembly	 that	 would	 convert	 BMPIU	
nto	an	autonomous	procurement	regulator	wthn	the	executve	branch,	empowered	
to	 ssue	 procurement	 rules,	 consstent	 wth	 statutory	 prncples	 of	 open	 compet-
tve	tenderng,	and	wth	a	separate	appeals	mechansm.	It	wll	be	mportant	for	ths	
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legslaton	to	be	passed,	mplemented	n	substance	as	well	as	n	form,	and	emulated	
by	the	other	ters	of	government,	whch	generally	have	not	moved	yet	to	renstate	
open	compettve	tenderng	as	effectvely	as	the	FGN.	At	the	state	level,	contracts	of	
any	magntude	are	effectvely	determned	by	the	governor.	At	all	levels	of	govern-
ment	procurement	staff	need	to	be	traned,	preferably	through	the	establshment	of	a	
specalst	procurement	cadre,	and	steps	taken	to	ensure	that	both	captal	and	current	
budget	contractng	of	works,	goods	and	servces	are	compettve.
11.4.20 PI-20:Effectivenessofinternalcontrolsfornon-salaryexpenditure
Best	practce	entals	comprehensve	expendture	commtment	controls	whch	effec-
tvely	lmt	commtments	to	actual	cash	avalable	and	approved	budget	allocatons,	
supported	by	other	relevant	nternal	controls	and	rules,	wth	hgh	complance,	nsg-
nificant misuse, and very limited use of emergency procedures.
The	FGN’s	 current	 control	 framework	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 pre-ndependence	F-
nance	 (Control	 and	Management)	Act	 of	 1958,	 and	 Fnancal	 Regulatons	 ssued	
thereafter	(the	latest	beng	n	1999	–	essentally	a	ressue). Though	fundamentally	
sound,	the	present	system	reles	manly	upon	manual	procedures	of	accountng	and	
reportng;	although	ts	abuse	s	less	than	what	t	used	to	be	under	mltary	rule,	there	
s	wdespread	dsregard	of	all	types	of	controls.	The	same	control	framework	oper-
ates	n	states	(though	there	s	no	actual	state	legslaton	n	place,	just	regulatons),	
and the same lack of financial discipline applies as well. At all levels, there is far too 
frequent	resort	to	emergency	exceptons.	Aware	of	the	weakness	n	nternal	controls,	
the	FMoF	seeks	to	control	spendng	through	cash	ratonng.	
In	theory,	furnshng	monthly	budget	executon	reports	should	be	a	condton	of	
cash	release,	but	ths	s	not	strctly	appled	and	many	MDAs	run	late	wth	ther	re-
portng.	Poor	record-keepng	of	commtments	by	MDAs	and	ther	falure	to	regularly	
report	on	both	actual	spendng	and	outstandng	commtments	mean	that	the	FMoF	
has	lttle	knowledge	of	the	magntude	of	commtments	accumulated	durng	the	year.	
The	 remakng	of	 the	budget	 through	 the	 cash	 release	 system,	necessary	 n	 the	
executve’s	vew	 to	 restore	macroeconomc	balance	and	spendng	prortes	 to	 the	
budget,	 leads	to	delays	and	unpredctablty	of	fundng	to	MDAs.	The	late	release	
causes low capital budget spending within the fiscal year, and thus a large carry-over. 
Instead	of	makng	ths	a	charge	aganst	next	year’s	budget,	the	FMoF	n	the	past	two	
years	has	contnued	fundng	the	carry-over	aganst	the	orgnal	appropraton,	n	the	
face	of	poltcal	pressure	to	mplement	captal	budget	spendng.	Ths	has	resulted	n	
an effective extension of the financial year up to at least next June and the spending 
n	2006	of	around	$2	bllon	of	2005	appropratons	from	the	captal	account.	Ths	
practce	undermnes	the	annualty	of	the	budget.	
Steps	are	beng	 taken	 to	modernze	expendture	control	and	asset	management	
systems	across	government.	The	cash	release	system	has	been	tghtened,	so	that	cash	
balances	n	MDA	commercal	bank	accounts	declned.	Due	process	has	sharply	re-
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duced	excessve	advance	fee	payments	on	contracts.	The	FMoF	now	receves	more	
timely information on ministerial spending, and the Accountant-General’s Office has 
been taking the first steps towards installing an integrated financial management sys-
tem.	The	challenge	now	s	to	ncrease	the	pressure	on	MDAs	to	report	and	reconcle	
accounts, placing sanctions on those accounting officers who do not exercise proper 
stewardship over their votes, and to place greater emphasis on financial manage-
ment	as	a	crteron	of	career	advancement	wthn	the	cvl	servce.	Smlar	challenges	
preval	at	the	state	level,	where	a	small	number	of	states	have	nvested	n	ntegrated	
financial management systems (for example Lagos and Delta), but generally finan-
cal	dscplne	s	weak.
11.4.21 PI-21:Effectiveinternalaudit
The	benchmark	s	operatonal	nternal	audt	for	all	central	government	enttes	that	
meets professional standards and focuses on systemic issues, adheres to a fixed 
schedule, and produces reports to the audited entity, the finance ministry and the 
supreme audit institution. Action by management on internal audit findings is prompt 
and	comprehensve.
At	both	federal	and	state	levels,	nternal	audt	unts	exst	n	most	MDAs,	staffed	
by	audtors	posted	by	the	Accountant-General.	The	emphass	s	on	complance	rather	
than	systems	audtng.	There	s	no	separate	career	stream	for	audtors,	who	are	drawn	
from	the	wder	pool	of	government	accountants,	the	mnorty	of	whom	are	profes-
sionally qualified. The weaknesses of the present system are recognized, including 
the difficulty in recruiting and retaining professionally qualified staff on government 
pay	scales.	The	OAGF	has	been	makng	efforts	to	tran	staff	n	modern	audtng	tech-
nques,	and	to	encourage	unts	to	undertake	more	system-based	audts.	
The	greatest	constrant	s	not	lack	of	capacty,	however.	Rather	t	s	weakness	on	
the demand side of the financial accountability equation. Presently, the climate for 
PFM at all levels of government is ‘soft’, with few officers sanctioned for irregulari-
ties. Thus management response to internal audit findings is disappointing, and this 
feeds	back	to	the	qualty	of	audt.	To	tghten	the	system,	the	FMoF,	wth	the	pres-
dent’s	backng,	needs	more	emphatcally	to	wthhold	releases	to	departments	whch	
fail to address deficiencies in their control systems. Only when accounting officers 
have	a	strong	ncentve	to	demand	the	products	of	nternal	audt,	wll	performance	
move	to	the	hgher	level.
11.4.22 PI-22:Timelinessandregularityofaccountsreconciliation
In modern financial management systems, bank account reconciliation is fully auto-
mated	and	done	at	least	on	a	daly	bass.	For	PEFA	the	standard	s	reconclaton	for	
all	central	government	bank	accounts	at	least	monthly	at	aggregate	and	detaled	lev-
els,	wth	reconclaton	and	clearance	of	suspense	accounts	at	least	quarterly,	wthn	a	
month	from	the	end	of	perod	and	wth	few	balances	brought	forward.
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Reconclaton	of	bank	accounts	s	begnnng	to	mprove	wth	the	mplementaton	
of	the	ATRRS,	wth	more	MDAs	reportng	ther	accounts	transcrpts,	ncludng	bank	
reconclaton	statements,	on	tme.	A	contnung	challenge	s	the	volume	of	advances	
to public employees in the form of per diems for workshops and other benefits, in 
turn	a	product	of	the	use	of	these	as	quas	salary	supplements	to	augment	low	pay.	
Advances	are	also	pad	to	contractors,	though	abuse	n	ths	area	has	been	much	re-
duced	recently.	Encouragngly,	n	2006	the	OAGF	has	been	empowered	to	wthhold	
releases	from	MDAs	whch	default	n	the	monthly	submsson	of	budget	executon	
reports,	and	has	selectvely	begun	dong	so.	The	corollary,	though,	s	that,	wthout	an	
external	stmulus,	MDAs	see	lttle	ntrnsc	value	n	reconclng	ther	bank	accounts	
and generally operating effective financial control systems. In turn this reflects the 
soft financial management culture that pervades the public sector at all levels; chang-
ng	ths	to	make	reportng	and	accountng	valued	for	ts	own	sake	s	a	major	govern-
ance	challenge	for	future	admnstratons.
11.4.23 PI-23: Availability of information on resources received by service
deliveryunits
Best	practce	s	routne	data	collecton	or	accountng	systems	whch	provde	relable	
nformaton	on	all	types	of	resources	receved	n	cash	and	n	knd	by	both	prmary	
schools	and	prmary	health	clncs	across	the	country.	Ths	nformaton	s	compled	
nto	reports	at	least	annually.
As	a	federal	state,	Ngera’s	accountng	nformaton	on	resources	used	by	serv-
ce	delvery	unts	wll	always	be	spread	over	a	large	number	of	governments,	ren-
dering difficult the consolidation of information on a regular basis. Currently, there 
s	no	drect	accountng	nformaton	avalable	at	the	federal	level	regardng	the	full	
amount	of	resources	used	wthn	key	segments	of	the	publc	sector	because	there	s	
no	system	for	aggregate	consoldaton	of	accountng	nformaton	from	states	and	lo-
cal	governments.	Moreover,	external	grants	and	loans	are	not	covered	by	the	exstng	
budget	process.	Thus	t	s	not	possble	to	say	how	much	total	publc	spendng	there	
s	on	basc	socal	servces	n	Ngera.	Furthermore,	at	local	government	level,	there	
s	wdespread	msallocaton	 and	msreportng	 of	 expendtures.	The	 avalablty	 of	
budget	nformaton	at	the	local	level	s	very	low,	and	the	budgets	of	ndvdual	front-
lne	servce	provders	are	unobtanable	to	local	communty	groups,	who	beleve	that	
much	of	the	money	s	ether	sphoned	off	or	spent	on	salares.
A	promsng	development	s	the	arrangements	now	n	place	to	montor	the	use	of	
savngs	from	the	Pars	Club	debt	relef,	whch	the	FGN	has	commtted	to	spend	on	
Mllennum	Development	Goal	programmes.	These	wll	be	 ntensvely	montored,	
including by programme beneficiaries. The hope is that the monitoring of MDG 
programmes	wll	spearhead	better	montorng	and	reportng	practce	across	govern-
ment.
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11.4.24 PI-24:Qualityandtimelinessofin-yearbudgetreports
Best	practce	n	n-year	reportng	entals:	()	presentaton	of	data	to	allow	drect	com-
parson	of	budget	executon	wth	the	orgnal	budget,	wth	nformaton	on	all	budget	
tems	and	both	commtment	and	dsbursement	stages;	()	quarterly	or	more	frequent	
reports	ssued	wthn	four	weeks	of	the	end	of	perod;	()	no	materal	concerns	re-
garding data accuracy; and (iv) reliable instruments for data verification, based upon 
a combination of field monitoring, audit and statistical analysis.
Untl	the	roll-out	of	the	ATRRS,	monthly	reportng	by	MDAs	was	poor,	and	the	
FMoF	dd	not	have	a	clear	pcture	of	budget	executon.	Ths	has	mproved,	and	re-
lease	of	current	and	captal	spendng	to	MDAs	s	now	supposed	to	be	condtonal	on	
reports	havng	been	receved,	wth	stronger	enforcement	by	FMoF	than	before.	But,	
whle	mnsteral	reportng	has	mproved,	ths	cannot	be	sad	for	other	parts	of	gov-
ernment.	There	are	no	regular	n-year	reports	of	use	of	budget	funds	by	parastatals,	
federal	extra-budgetary	funds	and	autonomous	agences.	In-year	reportng	by	MDAs	
at	the	state	government	level	s	very	uneven	and	performance	s	not	lnked	to	release	
of	cash.	
Physcal	montorng	of	projects	has	always	been	weak	n	Ngera.	Although	each	
agency	usually	has	a	montorng	unt	n-house,	they	produce	lttle	and	are	held	n	low	
esteem.	Travellng	to	vst	a	project	has	tradtonally	been	seen	as	a	way	of	generat-
ng	per	dems and other benefits, with reporting on outputs a secondary objective. 
Agan	t	s	hoped	that	the	more	rgorous	approach	to	reportng	and	montorng	of	the	
MDG	projects	wll	lead	the	way	to	better	across	the	board	practces.	If	t	contnues,	
weak	reportng	wll	 leave	 the	government	 ncreasngly	open	 to	dverson	of	 funds	
and	outrght	corrupton.	Techncal	mprovements	are	straghtforward,	but	the	real	test	
s	a	governance	one	–	whether	the	purpose	of	budgets	s	the	spendng	of	money	as	an	
end	n	tself,	or	as	a	means	to	produce	socally	desrable	outputs,	whch	are	expected	
to be verified. 
11.4.25 PI-25: Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements
The	standard	here	s	the	tmely	producton	of	consoldated	government	statements,	
which include full information on revenue, expenditure and financial assets/liabili-
tes,	consstent	wth	IPSAS	or	equvalent	natonal	standards,	and	are	submtted	for	
external audit within six months of the end of the fiscal year.
Ths	s	an	area	where	performance	at	the	federal	level	has	been	exceptonally	poor	
– as of the beginning of 2006, no full set of audited government financial statements 
have	been	presented	 to	 the	Natonal	Assembly	snce	2001,	 to	 the	consternaton	of	
legslators.	However,	an	effort	s	under	way	to	reduce	the	backlog	of	late	accounts.	A	
major	reason	for	the	backlog	s	the	delay	by	MDAs	n	producng	ther	accounts	for	
consoldaton	by	the	Accountant-General.	Laggards,	however,	have	not	been	sanc-
toned,	though	ndcatons	are	that	reportng	dscplne	s	beng	tghtened	up.	Overall,	
the	delay	n	producton	of	accounts	s	a	telltale	of	the	slght	mportance	that	has	been	
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attached over the years to financial accountability. States present a mixed picture 
of	laggards,	but	there	are	some	states	whch	are	ahead	of	the	federal	government	n	
producing financial accounts on time. 
11.4.26 PI-26:Scope,natureandfollow-upofexternalaudit
The	best-practce	standard	s	for	all	enttes	of	central	government	to	be	audted	annu-
ally. A full range of financial audits (covering revenue, expenditure and financial as-
sets/labltes)	and	some	aspects	of	performance	audt	are	expected	to	be	performed	
to a generally accepted standard, focusing on significant and systemic issues. Audit 
reports	are	submtted	to	the	legslature	wthn	four	months	of	the	end	of	perod	cov-
ered and, in the case of financial statements, from their receipt by the audit office. 
There is clear evidence of effective and timely follow-up on audit findings.
Ngera’s	consttuton	sets	a	90-day	lmt	for	audtors-general	to	submt	ther	re-
ports to the legislatures, and federal Financial Regulations require that the financial 
accounts be submitted for audit within six months of the end of the financial year. 
Were	 ths	 tmetable	 to	 be	 adhered	 to,	Ngera	would	meet	 the	 standards	 as	 far	 as	
tmelness	s	concerned.	As	already	noted,	the	Audtor-General’s	chef	constrant	s	
delayed	submsson	of	accounts	 to	audt	 from	the	Accountant-General.	Audt	cov-
erage	 extends	 to	 all	mnstres,	 extra-mnsteral	 departments	 and	 agences,	 and	 s	
chiefly compliance based.
Surprisingly, there is currently no specific legislation covering the powers and 
dutes	of	the	Audtor-General,	the	prevous	law	havng	been	excluded	from	the	1991	
consolidation of laws of Nigeria. But authority for the office is conveyed by the 
Consttuton,	and	absence	of	a	statutory	framework	(mrrored	also	by	most	states)	
does	not	seem	to	have	been	a	hndrance,	though	enactment	of	a	modern	procurement	
law	would	provde	an	opportunty	to	modernze	also	audt	strategy	and	methods.	A	
new	Audt	Bll	s	before	the	Natonal	Assembly,	and	would	strengthen	the	ndepend-
ence of the supreme audit authority, freeing his office from debilitating civil service 
rules.	
Follow-up of audit findings is weak. There is no formal mechanism of reporting 
back to the Public Accounts Committees (PACs) on actions taken on previous find-
ngs,	and	no	systematc	follow-up	of	actons	taken	by	the	executve.	Moves	are	afoot	
to	gve	the	FMoF	the	authorty	to	do	ths.	A	new	audt	law	would	not	only	mandate	
reporting back on actions taken, but also spell out the penalties for accounting offic-
ers	of	non-complyng	MDAs.	On	ts	part,	there	s	a	need	for	the	supreme	audt	nst-
tuton	to	be	more	ambtous	n	ts	audts,	focusng	scarce	staff	resources	on	hgh-rsk	
areas, and more frankly evaluating the efficacy of financial control systems. There 
also needs to be more aggressive follow-up of individual audit findings by MDAs.
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11.4.27 PI-27:Legislativescrutinyoftheannualbudgetlaw
The benchmark best practice is for the legislature’s review to cover fiscal policies, 
medium-term fiscal framework and priorities, as well as details of revenue and 
expenditure. The legislature’s procedures for review should be firmly established 
and	respected,	wth	at	least	two	months	to	revew	the	budget	proposals.	Clear	rules	
should	exst	for	n-year	budget	amendments	by	the	executve,	whch	set	strct	lmts	
on	extent	and	nature	of	amendments	and	are	consstently	respected.	
Snce	the	return	to	democracy,	there	has	been	actve	scrutny	of	the	executve’s	
budget	proposals	by	the	legslature.	Unlke	n	most	other	Afrcan	countres,	whch	
began	wth	a	Westmnster	model	of	government,	Ngera,	n	pursut	of	US-type	con-
sttutonal	arrangements	entalng	a	full	separaton	of	powers,	mposes	no	constrants	
on	the	extent	to	whch	the	legslature	can	change	the	budget	put	forward	by	the	ex-
ecutve.	State	legslatures	have	dentcal	powers,	though	they	have	generally	tended	
not	to	use	them.	In	many	of	the	years	snce	the	return	to	cvlan	rule,	there	have	been	
bitter fights over the respective roles of the federal executive and the legislature in 
budget-making, resulting in gross inflation of ex ante budget, chiefly by Assembly’s 
addng	new	programmes	and	projects.	 In	 turn,	 ths	has	prompted	 the	executve	 to	
use	the	cash	release	system	to	selectvely	mplement	the	budget	as	passed,	and	so	
to	restore	orgnal	spendng	prortes.	Although	the	2006	budget	was	a	lttle	better,	
ths	antagonstc	relatonshp	between	the	executve	and	the	legslature	has	typcally	
delayed the approval of the new budget until well into the first half of the new finan-
cal	year.	
There	are	 steps	beng	undertaken	 to	make	budget-makng	 less	confrontatonal.	
When	the	Fscal	Responsblty	Law	s	passed,	each	ter	of	government	wll	have	to	
make its budgets consistent with the fiscal framework set by the FMoF. The inde-
pendent	Budget	Process	Bll	would	mandate	a	two-stage	process	of	budget	approval,	
though	 t	mght	dangerously	shft	budget-makng	power	 towards	 the	 legslature,	a	
stuaton	of	concern	to	many	observers,	gven	the	legslature’s	evdent	lack	of	spend-
ng	constrants.	Clear	rules	exst	for	 n-year	budget	amendments	by	the	executve,	
orgnatng	n	the	Fnance	(Control	and	Management)	Act	of	1958,	but	over	the	years	
a great deal of abuse has crept in. The challenge is twofold. The first part is to install 
a modern financial management legal framework for transparent and accountable 
spendng	of	 publc	mones.	The	 second	part	 s	 ensurng	 that	 the	 legal	 framework	
for	PFM	n	Ngera,	once	t	has	been	modernzed,	s	taken	serously	by	all	budget	
actors.
11.4.28 PI-28:Legislativescrutinyofexternalauditreports
Best	practce	calls	for	scrutny	of	audt	reports	by	the	legslature	wthn	three	months	
of receipt, in-depth hearings in which officers of the audited department participate, 
and	the	ssue	of	recommendatons	by	the	legslature	to	be	mplemented	by	the	gov-
ernment.	
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The	ssue	n	Ngera	s	not	the	tme	taken	for	audt	by	the	publc	accounts	commt-
tees	formed	by	both	Houses	–	whch	seems	reasonable	–	but	the	delay	n	recevng	
annual	accounts	from	the	Audtor-General,	who,	n	turn,	s	dependent	on	the	subms-
son	of	accounts	by	 the	Audtor-General.	Even	so,	 some	PAC	hearngs	have	been	
held, which are open to the public, officials are required to attend, and conclusions 
are	drawn	and	recommendatons	made.	If	the	Audt	Bll	now	before	the	legslature	s	
passed, this will give the SAI more independence, in terms of both staffing and mate-
rals,	whch	should	enable	t	to	serve	better	the	legslatve	revew.	Most	crtcal	s	the	
passage	of	the	Fscal	Responsblty	Bll,	whch	holds	the	hope	of	more	harmonous	
relations between the executive and the legislature on public financial management 
matters	n	the	future.
Notes
	 1	 Ths	chapter	was	prepared	on	the	bass	of	the	authors’	contrbuton	to	Ngera’s	Publc	Ex-
pendture	Management	and	Fnancal	Accountablty	Revew	(PEMFAR),	a	recent	report	
by	the	World	Bank	(2006).	We	would	lke	to	acknowledge	a	consderable	contrbuton	to	
the	detaled	PEMFAR	assessment	by	other	members	of	the	World	Bank	team,	n	partcular	
Allan	Gustafsson,	Chnedum	Nwoko,	Illara	Chessa,	Bayo	Awosemus	and	Gert	van	der	
Lnde.
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